




















































































































































Although most empirical research on treatment eects focuses on the estimation of dier-
ences in mean outcomes, analysts have long been interested in methods for estimating the
impact of a treatment on the entire distribution of outcomes. This is especially true in
economics, where social welfare comparisons may require integration of utility functions
under alternative distributions of income. Following Atkinson (1970), consider the class of




where P is an income distribution and u : R 7! R. Let P(1) and P(0) denote the (potential)
distributions that income would follow if the population were exposed to the treatment in
one case, and excluded from the treatment in the other case. For a given u =  u, we rank
P(1) and P(0), by comparing W(P(1);  u) and W(P(0);  u).
Typically, u is not xed by the analyst but is restricted to belong to some particular
classes of functions. Then, stochastic dominance can be used to establish a partial ordering
on the distributions of income. If two income distributions can be ranked by rst order
stochastic dominance, these distributions will be ranked in the same way by any monotonic
utilitarian social welfare function (u0 > 0). If two income distributions can be ranked by
second order stochastic dominance, these distributions will be ranked in the same way by
any concave monotonic utilitarian social welfare function (u0 > 0, u00 < 0) (see Foster and
Shorrocks (1988) for details). Therefore, stochastic dominance can be used evaluate the
distributional consequences of treatments under mild assumptions about social preferences.
Another possible question is whether the treatment has any eect on the distribution of
the outcome, that is, whether or not the two distributions P(1) and P(0) are the same.
In general, the assessment of the distributional consequences of treatments may be
carried on by estimating P(1) and P(0). Estimation of the potential income distributions,
P(1) and P(0), is straightforward when the treatment is randomly assigned in the popu-
lation. However, this type of analysis becomes dicult in observational studies (or in
1randomized experiments with imperfect compliance) when treatment intake is not ran-
domly determined. Recently, Imbens and Rubin (1997) have shown that, when there is a
binary instrumental variable available for the researcher, the potential distributions of the
outcome variable are identied for the subpopulation potentially aected in their treatment
status by variation in the instrument (the so-called compliers). However, this last feature
has never been used to compare the entire potential outcome distributions under dier-
ent treatments in a statistically rigorous way, that is, by performing hypotheses testing.
This paper proposes a bootstrap strategy to perform this kind of comparisons. In particu-
lar, equality in distributions, rst order stochastic dominance and second order stochastic
dominance hypotheses, all important for social welfare comparisons, are considered.
The proposed method is applied to the study of the eects of Vietnam veteran status
on the distribution of civilian earnings. Following Angrist (1990), random variation in
enrollment induced by the Vietnam era draft lottery is used to identify the eects of veteran
status on civilian earnings. However, the focus of the present paper is not restricted to
the average treatment eect for compliers. The entire marginal distributions of potential
earnings for veterans and non-veterans are described for this subgroup of the population.
These distributions dier in a notable way from the corresponding distributions of realized
earnings. Veteran status appears to reduce lower quantiles of the earnings distribution,
leaving higher quantiles unaected. Although the data show a fair amount of evidence
against equality in potential income distributions for veterans and non-veterans, statistical
testing falls short of rejecting this hypothesis at conventional signicance levels. First and
second order stochastic dominance of the potential income distribution for non-veterans
are not rejected by the data.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I brie
y review a framework
for identication of treatment eects in instrumental variable models and show how to
estimate the distributions of potential outcomes for compliers. In contrast with Imbens and
Rubin (1997) who report histogram estimates of these distributions, here a simple method
is shown to estimate the cumulative distribution functions (cdf) of the same variables.
2The estimation of cdfs has some advantages over the histogram estimates. First, there
is no need for making an arbitrary choice of width for the bins of the histogram. The
cdf, estimated by instrumental variable methods, can be evaluated at each observation in
our sample, just as for the conventional empirical distribution function. In addition, this
strategy allows us to implement nonparametric tests based directly on dierences in the
cdfs (see Darling (1957) for a review of this class of tests). Often, it is easier to dene
and test some distributional hypotheses of interest in economics, such as rst or second
order stochastic dominance, using cdfs rather than histograms (see Anderson (1996) for an
approach based on histograms). Finally, a complete description of the bootstrap strategy
is provided along with a proposition which states the asymptotic validity of the bootstrap
for the tests proposed in this paper. Section 3 describes the data and presents the empirical
results. Section 4 concludes.
2. Statistical Methods
Let Yi(0) be the potential outcome for individual i without treatment, and Yi(1) the po-
tential outcome for the same individual under treatment. Dene Di to be the treatment
participation indicator (that is, Di equals one when individual i has been exposed to the
treatment, Di equals zero otherwise.) In practice, the analyst does not observe both Yi(0)
and Yi(1) for any individual i, since one of these outcomes is counterfactual. Instead, the
realized outcome, Yi = Yi(1)Di +Yi(0)(1 Di), is observed. Let Zi be a binary variable
that is independent of the responses Yi(0) and Yi(1) but that is correlated with Di in the
population (an instrument). Denote Di(0) the value that Di would have taken if Zi = 0;
Di(1) has the same meaning for Zi = 1. Again, for any particular individual the analyst
does not observe both potential treatment indicators Di(0) and Di(1); instead the realized
treatment Di = Di(1)Zi+Di(0)(1 Zi) is observed. In the analysis of randomized experi-
ments with imperfect compliance, Zi usually represents treatment assignment (randomized)
while Di represents treatment intake (non-randomized). In observational studies instru-
ments are often provided by the so-called \natural experiments" or \quasi-experiments".
3For rest of the paper I will use the following identifying assumption:
Assumption 2.1:
(i) Independence of the Instrument : (Yi(0);Yi(1);Di(0);Di(1)) is independent of Zi.
(ii) First Stage : 0 < P(Zi = 1) < 1 and P(Di(1) = 1) > P(Di(0) = 1).
(iii) Monotonicity : P(Di(1)  Di(0)) = 1.
Assumption 2.1 contains a set of nonparametric restrictions under which instrumental vari-
able models identify the causal eect of the treatment for the subpopulation potentially
aected in their treatment status by variation in the instrument: Di(1) = 1 and Di(0) = 0
(see Imbens and Angrist (1994), Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996)). This subpopula-
tion is sometimes called compliers. When the treatment intake, Di, is itself randomized,
Assumption 2.1 holds for Zi = Di and every individual is a complier.
Notice that there are some important exclusion restrictions implicit in the notation.
First, for each individual i, potential outcomes do not depend on other individuals' treat-
ment intakes. This restriction is called Stable-Unit-Treatment-Value-Assumption (SUTVA)
and is frequently used in statistical models of causal inference (see Rubin (1990)). In ad-
dition, potential outcomes do not depend on Zi. This last restriction, commonly invoked
in instrumental variable models, allows us to attribute correlation between the instrument
and the outcome variables to the eect of the treatment alone.
In this paper, I study distributional eects of possibly non-randomized treatments by
comparing the distributions of potential outcomes Yi(1) and Yi(0) with and without the
treatment. The rst step is to show that the identication conditions in Assumption 2.1
allow us to estimate these distributions for the subpopulation of compliers. To estimate
the cdfs of potential outcomes for compliers, the following lemma will be useful.
Lemma 2.1: Let h(:) be a measurable function on the real line such that Ejh(Yi)j < 1. If
Assumption 2.1 holds, then
E[h(Yi)DijZi = 1]   E[h(Yi)DijZi = 0]
E[DijZi = 1]   E[DijZi = 0]
= E[h(Yi(1))jDi(0) = 0;Di(1) = 1] (1)
4and,
E[h(Yi)(1   Di)jZi = 1]   E[h(Yi)(1   Di)jZi = 0]
E[(1   Di)jZi = 1]   E[(1   Di)jZi = 0]
= E[h(Yi(0))jDi(0) = 0;Di(1) = 1]:
(2)
Proof: By Lemma 4.2 in Dawid (1979), we have that (h(Yi(0))Di(0);h(Yi(1))Di(1);Di(0);
Di(1)) is independent of Zi. Then by Theorem 1 in Imbens and Angrist (1994), we have
that
E[h(Yi(1))  Di(1)   h(Yi(0))  Di(0)jDi(0) = 0;Di(1) = 1] =
E[h(Yi)  DijZi = 1]   E[h(Yi)  DijZi = 0]
E[DijZi = 1]   E[DijZi = 0]
:
Finally, notice that E[h(Yi(1))Di(1) h(Yi(0))Di(0)jDi(0) = 0;Di(1) = 1] = E[h(Yi(1))j
Di(0) = 0;Di(1) = 1], which proves the rst part of the lemma. The second part of the
lemma follows from an analogous argument. 2
Lemma 2.1 provides us with a simple way to estimate the cumulative distribution func-
tions of the potential outcomes for compliers. Dene FC1(y) = E[1fYi(1)  ygjDi(1) =
1;Di(0) = 0] and FC0(y) = E[1fYi(0)  ygjDi(1) = 1;Di(0) = 0]. Apply Lemma 2.1 with
h(Yi) = 1fYi  yg to get
FC1(y) =
E[1fYi  ygDijZi = 1]   E[1fYi  ygDijZi = 0]




E[1fYi  yg(1   Di)jZi = 1]   E[1fYi  yg(1   Di)jZi = 0]
E[(1   Di)jZi = 1]   E[(1   Di)jZi = 0]
: (4)
Suppose that we have a random sample, f(Yi;Di;Zi)gn
i=1, drawn from the studied popu-
lation. The sample counterparts of equations (3) and (4) can be used to estimate FC1(y)
and FC0(y) for y = fY1;::;Yng. We can compare the distributions of potential outcomes by
plotting the estimates of FC1 and FC0. This comparison tells us how the treatment aects
dierent parts of the distribution of the outcome variable, at least for the subpopulation
of compliers.
5Researchers often want to formalize this type of comparisons using statistical hypothesis
testing. In particular, a researcher may want to compare FC1 and FC0 by testing the
hypotheses of equality in distributions, rst order stochastic dominance and second order
stochastic dominance. For two distributions functions FA and FB, the hypotheses of interest
can be formulated as follows.
Equality of Distributions:
FA(y) = FB(y) 8y 2 R (H.1)
First Order Stochastic Dominance: FA dominates FB if
FA(y)  FB(y) 8y 2 R (H.2)






FB(x) dx 8y 2 R (H.3)
One possible way to carry on these tests for the distributions of potential outcomes for
compliers is to use statistics directly based on the comparison between the estimates for
FC1 and FC0. However, it is easier to test the implications of these hypotheses on the two
conditional distributions of the outcome variable given Zi = 1 and Zi = 0. Denote F1
the cdf of the outcome variable conditional on Zi = 1, and dene F0 in the same way for
Zi = 0. That is, F1(y) = E[1fYi  ygjZi = 1] and F0(y) = E[1fYi  ygjZi = 0].
Proposition 2.1: Under Assumption 2.1, hypotheses (H.1)-(H.3) hold for (FA;FB) = (FC1;
FC0) if and only if they hold for (FA;FB) = (F1;F0).
Proof: From equations (3) and (4), we have
FC1(y)   FC0(y) =
E[1fYi  ygjZi = 1]   E[1fYi  ygjZi = 0]
E[DijZi = 1]   E[DijZi = 0]
:
Therefore FC1   FC0 = K  (F1   F0) for K = 1=(E[DijZi = 1]   E[DijZi = 0]) < 1, and
the result of the proposition holds. 2
Of course, F1 and F0 can be easily estimated by the empirical distribution of Yi for Zi = 1
and Zi = 0 respectively. Divide (Y1;:::;Yn) into two subsamples given by dierent values
6for the instrument, (Y1;1;:::;Y1;n1) are those observations with Zi = 1 and (Y0;1;:::;Y0;n0)












Then, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic provides a natural way to measure the dis-
crepancy in the data from the hypothesis of equality in distributions. A two-sample







jF1;n1(y)   F0;n0(y)j: (5)
Following McFadden (1989), the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic can be modied to tests







(F1;n1(y)   F0;n0(y)); (6)









(F1;n1(x)   F0;n0(x)) dx: (7)
This kind of nonparametric distance tests have in general good power properties. Un-
fortunately, the asymptotic distributions of the test statistics under the null hypotheses is,
in general, unknown, since it depends on the underlying distribution of the data (see e.g.,
Romano (1988)). In this paper, I use a bootstrap strategy to overcome such a problem.
This strategy is described by the following 4 steps:
Step 1: In what follows, let T be a generic notation for Teq, Tfsd or Tssd. Compute
the statistic T for the original samples (Y1;1;:::;Y1;n1) and (Y0;1;:::;Y0;n0).
Step 2: Resample n observations (Y 
1 ;:::;Y 
n) from (Y1;:::;Yn) with replacement. Di-
vide (Y 
1 ;:::;Y 
n) into two samples: (Y 
1;1;:::;Y 
1;n1) given by the n1 rst elements of
(Y 
1 ;:::;Y 
n), and (Y 
0;1;:::;Y 
0;n0) given by the n0 last elements of (Y 
1 ;:::;Y 
n). Use
these two generated samples to compute the test statistic T 
(b).
7Step 3: Repeat Step 2 B times.




(b) > Tg. Reject
the null hypotheses if p-value is smaller than some signicance level .
By resampling from the pooled data set (Y1;:::;Yn) we approximate the distribution
of our test statistics when F1 = F0. Note that for (H.2) and (H.3), F1 = F0 represents
the least favorable case for the null hypotheses. This strategy allows us to estimate the
supremum of the probability of rejection under the composite null hypotheses, which is the
conventional denition of test size. Justication of the asymptotic validity of this procedure
is provided by the following proposition.
Proposition 2.2: The procedure described in Steps 1 to 4, for T equal to the test statistics
in equations (5)-(7) and hypotheses (H.1)-(H.3), (i) provides correct asymptotic level, (ii)
is consistent against any xed alternative, (iii) has power (greater or equal to size) against
contiguous alternatives.
This proposition is proven in Appendix A. The results of a simulation study to assess
the small sample performance of the tests proposed in this paper are reported in Appendix
B. This simulation study suggests that the bootstrap distribution of the tests provides a
good approximation to the nominal level even in fairly small samples.
The idea of using resampling techniques to obtain critical values for Kolmogorov-
Smirnov type statistics is probably due to Bickel (1969) and has also be used by Romano
(1988), McFadden (1989), Klecan et al. (1991), Prstgaard (1995) and Andrews (1997)
among others. A related approach based on simulation of p-values can be found in Barrett
and Donald (1999).
Note that Proposition 2.2 naturally applies to tests based on perfectly randomized
experiments (in which Zi = Di for all i).
83. Empirical Example
The data used in this study consist of a sample of 11,637 white men, born in 1950-1953, from
the March Current Population Surveys of 1979 and 1981 to 1985. Annual labor earnings,
weekly wages, Vietnam veteran status and an indicator of draft-eligibility based on the
Vietnam draft lottery outcome are provided for each individual in the sample. Additional
information about the data can be found in Appendix C.
Figure 1 shows the empirical distribution of realized annual labor earnings (from now
on, annual earnings) for veterans and non-veterans. We can observe that the distribution
of earnings for veterans has higher low quantiles and lower high quantiles than that for non-
veterans. A naive reasoning would lead us to conclude that military service in Vietnam
reduced the probability of extreme earnings without a strong eect on average earnings.
The dierence in means is indeed quite small. On average, veterans earn only $264 less
than non-veterans and this dierence is not signicant at conventional condence levels.
However, this analysis does not take into account the non-random nature of veteran status.
Veteran status was not assigned randomly in the population. The selection process in
the military service was in
uenced by variables associated to the potential earnings (like
educational attainment). Therefore, we cannot draw causal inferences by simply comparing
the distributions of realized earnings between veterans and non-veterans.
If draft eligibility is a valid instrument, the marginal distributions of potential outcomes
for compliers are consistently estimated by using equations (3) and (4). Figure 2 is the re-
sult of applying our data to those equations. Note that, in nite samples, the instrumental
variables estimates of the potential cdfs for compliers may not be increasingly monotonic
functions (see Imbens and Rubin (1997) for a related discussion). The most remarkable
feature of Figure 2 is the change in the estimated distributional eect of veteran status
on earnings with respect to the naive analysis. The average eect of military service for
compliers can be easily estimated using the techniques in Imbens and Angrist (1994). On
average, veteran status is estimated to have a negative impact of $1,278 on earnings for
compliers, although this eect is far from being statistically dierent from zero. Now, vet-
9eran status seems to reduce low quantiles of the income distribution, leaving high quantiles
unaected. If this characterization is true, the potential outcome for non-veterans would
dominate that for veterans in the rst order stochastic sense. The hypothesis of equality
in distributions seems less likely.
Following the strategy described in section 2, hypotheses testing is performed. Table
I reports p-values for the tests of equality in distributions, rst order and second order
stochastic dominance. Notice that, for this example, the stochastic dominance tests are for
earnings for non-veterans dominating earnings for veterans, so the signs of the statistics
Tfsd and Tssd are reversed. The rst row in Table I contains the results for annual earnings
as the outcome variable. In the second row the analysis is repeated for weekly wages.
Bootstrap resampling was performed 2,000 times (B = 2;000).
Consider rst the results for annual earnings. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic for
equality in distributions is revealed to take an unlikely high value under the null hypothesis.
However, we cannot reject equality in distributions at conventional condence levels. The
lack of evidence against the null hypothesis increases as we go from equality in distributions
to rst order stochastic dominance, and from rst order stochastic dominance to second
order stochastic dominance. The results for weekly wages are slightly dierent. For weekly
wages we fall far from rejecting equality in distributions at conventional condence levels.
This example illustrates how useful can be to think in terms of distributional eects,
and not merely average eects, when formulating the null hypotheses to test. Once we
consider distributional eects, the belief that military service in Vietnam has a negative
eect on civilian earnings can naturally be incorporated in the null hypothesis by rst or
second order stochastic dominance.
4. Conclusions
When treatment intake is not randomized, instrumental variable models allow us to iden-
tify the eects of treatments on some outcome variable, for the group of the population
aected in the treatment status by variation in the instrument. For such a group of the
10population, called compliers, the entire marginal distribution of the outcome under dier-
ent treatments can be estimated. In this paper, a strategy to test for distributional eects
of treatments within the population of compliers has been proposed. In particular, I fo-
cused on the equality in distributions, rst order stochastic dominance and second order
stochastic dominance hypotheses. First, it is explained a way to estimate the distribu-
tions of potential outcomes. Then, bootstrap resampling is used to approximate the null
distribution of our test statistics.
This method is illustrated with an application to the study of the eects of veteran
status on civilian earnings. Following Angrist (1990), variation in veteran status induced
by randomly assigned draft eligibility is used to identify the eects of interest. Estimates of
cumulative distribution functions of potential outcomes for compliers show an adverse eect
of military experience on the lower tail of the distribution of annual earnings. However,
equality in distributions cannot be rejected at conventional condence levels. First and
second order stochastic dominance are not rejected by the data. Results are more favorable
to equality in distributions when we use weekly wages as the outcome variable.
11Appendix A: Asymptotic Validity of the Bootstrap
Proof of Proposition 2.2: Part (i) can be proven by extending the argument in van der Vaart and
Wellner (1996) chapter 3.7 to tests for rst and second order stochastic dominance. Let P1, P0 be the
probability laws of Y conditional on Z = 1 and Z = 0 respectively. Let Q be the probability law of Z












where Y indicates a probability mass point at Y . Let F = f1f( 1;y]g : y 2 Rg, that is, the class of
indicators of all lower half lines in R. Since F is known to be universally Donsker, for n0;n1 ! 1 we have
G1;n1 = n
1=2
1 (P1;n1   P1) ) GP1 G0;n0 = n
1=2
0 (P0;n0   P0) ) GP0
in l1(F), where \)" denotes weak convergence, l1(F) is the set of all uniformly bounded real functions






where n = n0 + n1. If n ! 1, n = n1=n !  2 (0;1) almost surely. Then, if P1 = P0 = P,
Dn ) (1   )1=2  GP   1=2  G0
P, where GP and G0
P are independent versions of a P-Brownian bridge.
Since (1   )1=2  GP   1=2  G0
P is also a P-Brownian bridge, we have that Dn ) GP (see also Dudley
(1998), Theorem 11.1.1).
For t 2 R, let h(t) = 1f( 1;t]g 2 F and  the Lebesgue measure on R. For any z 2 l1(F), dene the fol-
lowing maps: Teq(z) = supf2F jz(f)j, Tfsd(z) = supf2F z(f) and Tssd(z) = supf2F
R
fg2F:gfg z(g) d(g)
where  =   h 1. Our test statistics are Teq(Dn), Tfsd(Dn) and Tssd(Dn). As before, let T be a generic
notation for Teq, Tfsd or Tssd. Notice that, for zn;z 2 l1(F), T(zn)  T(z)+T(zn  z). Since Teq is equal
to the norm in l1(F), trivially Teq is continuous. Tfsd is also continuous because Tfsd(zn z)  Teq(zn z).
Finally, if we restrict ourselves to functions zn;z 2 C(u;l) = fx(f) 2 l1(F) : x(h(t)) = 0 for t 2
( 1;l) [ (u;1)g, then it is easy to see that, for some nite K, Tssd(zn   z)  K  Tfsd(zn   z), so
Tssd is continuous. This restriction is innocuous if P1 and P0 have bounded support. For the stochastic
dominance tests we will use the least favorable case (P1 = P0) to derive the null asymptotic distribution.
Under the least favorable null hypotheses, by continuity, the tests statistics converge in distribution to
Teq(GP), Tfsd(GP) and Tssd(GP) respectively. Note that, in general, the asymptotic distribution of our
test statistics under the least favorable null hypotheses depends on the underlying probability P. It can
be easily seen that our test statistics tend to innity under any xed alternative.
Consider a test that rejects the null hypothesis if T(Dn) > cn. This test has asymptotic level  if
liminf cn  cP() = inffc : P(T(GP) > c)  g.
Since cP() depends on P, the sequence fcng is determined by a resampling method. Consider the pooled







then P1;n1   Hn = (1   n)(P1;n1   P0;n0). Let (Y 
1 ;:::Y 
n) be a random sample from the pooled empirical















12By Theorem 3.7.7 in van der Vaart and Wellner (1996), if n ! 1, then n
1=2
1 (b P1;n1   Hn) ) GH given
almost every sequence (Y1;1;:::;Y1;n1), (Y0;1;:::;Y0;n0), where H =   P1 + (1   )  P0. The same result
holds for n
1=2





(b P1;n1   b P0;n0):
Note that T( b Dn) = T((1   n)1=2n
1=2




0 (b P0;n0   Hn)). Therefore, T( b Dn) converges
in distribution to T((1   )1=2GH   1=2G0
H), where GH and G0
H are independent H-Brownian bridges.
Since (1   )1=2GH   1=2G0
H is also a H-Brownian bridge, we have that, if P1 = P0 = P, then for
cn = inffc : P(T( b Dn) > c)  g;
liminf cn  cP() = inffc : P(T(GP) > c)  g almost surely. The reason is that we can always
nd continuity points of the null distribution of T(GP) arbitrarily close to cP() but smaller than cP()
(otherwise the set of discontinuity points would be uncountable which is not possible by Theorem 4.30
in Rudin (1976)). By tightness of the limiting process, cn is bounded in probability and the tests are
consistent against any xed alternative. This proves (i) and (ii).
To prove (iii), consider sequences fP0;ng, fP1;ng of probability measures approaching a common limit P
in the following sense:
Z 
n1=2(dP 1=2





! 0 for z = 0;1; (A.1)
where x1, x0 are measurable real functions. It can be shown (van der Vaart and Wellner (1996), Lemma
3.10.11) that the sequences of product measures fPn
z;ng and fPng are contiguous, Pxz = 0 and Px2
z < 1
















xz(Yi) + op(1) for z = 0;1
under fPg. In addition, supf2F jn1=2(Pz;n   P)f   Pxzfj ! 0 for z = 0;1.
To assess the asymptotic power of our tests in this scenario, we rst need to study the asymptotic behavior
of n
1=2
z (Pz;nz(f)   P(f)) under sequences of local alternatives which follow (A.1). Note that under the
constant sequence fP;Qg, we have
B1;n(f) =
n1






















Px1f P(f   Pf)2

:
Applying Le Cam's third lemma, we obtain B1;n(f)
d ! N(Px1f;P(f   Pf)2) under the sequence
fP1;n;Qg. Since n1=n !  almost surely, then n
1=2
1 (P1;n1   P)(f)
d ! N(1=2Px1f;P(f   Pf)2). Using
the Donsker property of F, we obtain the uniform version of last result (see van der Vaart and Wellner
(1996), Theorem 3.10.12.) An analogous result holds for z = 0. Therefore,
Dn ) GP + 1=2(1   )1=2  (1   0)
where z(f) = Pxzf (this result corrects an error in Prstgaard (1995)). By contiguity arguments we
have that b Dn ) GP and therefore liminf cn  cP() almost surely. Then, using a version of Anderson's
13lemma for general Banach spaces (see, e.g., van der Vaart and Wellner (1996), Lemma 3.11.4), we obtain
the desired result for the test of equality of distributions.
The same result holds for rst and second order dominance tests (note that for these tests the sequence of
contiguous alternatives should be specied such that Tfsd(1  0)  0 and Tssd(1  0)  0 respectively.)
Appendix B: Small Sample Behavior
To assess the small sample performance of the tests proposed in this paper a Monte Carlo study was con-
ducted. To mimic as closely as possible the actual small sample behavior of these tests in real applications,
the data used for the simulation study comes from the empirical example of section 3. In each Monte Carlo
iteration, a sample of size n was drawn from the empirical distribution of annual earnings in the data.
Each sample was divided into two subsamples following the proportion of draft eligibles / non-eligibles in
the original data set. Then, the test statistics in equations (5) to (7) were computed and the bootstrap
tests were performed using 2,000 bootstrap iterations. This process was repeated for 4,000 Monte Carlo
iteration. Table A.I shows the results of this simulation study for samples sizes equal to 25, 50, 100, 250
and 500 and nominal test levels equal to 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01. Asymptotic standard errors (as the number
of Monte Carlo iterations tends to innity) are reported in the last row of the table. The table shows a
highly satisfactory performance of the tests, even in fairly small samples (n = 25).
Appendix C: Data Description
The data set was especially prepared for Angrist and Krueger (1995). Both annual earnings and weekly
wages are in real terms. Weekly wages are imputed by dividing annual labor earnings by the number of
weeks worked. The Vietnam era draft lottery is carefully described in Angrist (1990), where the validity
of draft eligibility as an instrument for veteran status is also studied. This lottery was conducted every
year between 1970 and 1974 and it used to assign numbers (from 1 to 365) to dates of birth in the cohorts
being drafted. Men with lowest numbers were called to serve up to a ceiling determined every year by the
Department of Defense. The value of that ceiling varied from 95 to 195 depending on the year. Here, an
indicator for lottery numbers lower than 100 is used as an instrument for veteran status. The fact that
draft eligibility aected the probability of enrollment along with its random nature makes this variable a
good candidate to instrument veteran status.
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Figure 1: Empirical Distributions of Earnings for Veterans and Non-Veterans















Figure 2: Estimated Distributions of Potential Earnings for Compliers
17Table I: Tests on Distributional Eects of Veteran Status on Civilian Earnings, p-values
Outcome Equality First Order Second Order
variable in Distributions Stochastic Dominance Stochastic Dominance
Annual Earnings .1245 .6260 .7415
Weekly Wages .2330 .6490 .7530
18Table A.I: True Test Size in Small Samples, Monte Carlo Simulation
Sample Nominal Test Level
Size ()
(n) .10 .05 .01
Equality of Distributions 25 .119 .062 .017
50 .114 .059 .015
100 .114 .055 .012
250 .106 .051 .011
500 .099 .047 .010
First Order Stochastic Dominance 25 .122 .059 .015
50 .109 .055 .012
100 .106 .056 .012
250 .105 .053 .011
500 .091 .049 .010
Second Order Stochastic Dominance 25 .110 .058 .011
50 .101 .050 .012
100 .104 .051 .009
250 .098 .049 .011
500 .100 .048 .011
s.e. .0047 .0034 .0016
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